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On the heels of news media accounts of corporate wrongdoing, the issue 
of corporate accountability periodically rises in prominence.  One method by 
which shareholders attempt to hold corporations accountable for alleged 
wrongdoing is the derivative lawsuit.  Because of judicial reluctance to 
interfere with the processes of an independent board of directors, plaintiffs 
must overcome the business judgment rule presumption in favor of the 
corporation in order to prevail.  The business judgment rule, along with the 
board’s ability to appoint an independent “special litigation committee” to 
determine whether the corporation should join the lawsuit or have it 
dismissed, significantly reduce the plaintiffs’ chances of success in derivative 
lawsuits. 
The recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Janssen v. Best & 
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Flanagan1 does not reach the important issue of which version of the 
business judgment rule Minnesota courts will apply in derivative lawsuits 
against for-profit and nonprofit corporations.  However, the court’s 
reasoning in resolving the case suggests that the strict, procedural version of 
the business judgment rule will be retained the next time the court reaches 
the issue.2  This note reviews the court’s reasoning and argues that both the 
theoretical justifications behind the business judgment rule and sound 
economic policy dictate that Minnesota’s strict application of the business 
judgment rule is the correct approach in the for-profit context.  In the 
nonprofit context, this note argues, the business judgment rule justifications 
do not apply as directly and traditional nonprofits should be subject to more 
exacting judicial review. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: PROTECTING BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
What do the Ford Motor Company, the Chicago Cubs, Disney 
and Martha Stewart have in common?  Each participated in 
litigation where the court wrestled with the question of how much 
deference to grant to board of director decisions.3  Defendants 
often raise the business judgment rule in cases disputing the major 
corporate controversies reflected in newspaper headlines such as 
“hostile” takeovers, excessive executive compensation, and insider 
trading.4  But the rule can also protect corporate boards against 
more routine claims such as lack of due care in corporate decision-
making.5  The business judgment rule is simply a presumption 
made by the reviewing court that the board’s decision was 
 
 1. 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003). 
 2. For a contrary view see Eric J. Moutz, Janssen v. Best & Flanagan: At Long 
Last, the Beginning of the End for the Auerbach Approach in Minnesota?, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 489 (2003) (arguing less deferential judicial review is desirable 
in general and that Janssen provides hints that the Minnesota Supreme Court is 
leaning toward less-deferential review). 
 3. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 
A.2d 961 (Del. Ch. 2003) (failure to monitor CEO’s alleged insider trading); 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (executive compensation at 
Disney); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (refusal to erect 
lights at home field of Chicago Cubs); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 
(Mich. 1919) (amount of declared dividends). 
 4. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) 
(corporate takeover); Brehm, 746 A.2d 244 (executive compensation); Beam, 833 
A.2d 961 (insider trading). 
 5. Compare Brehm, 746 A.2d at 267 (dismissing duty of care claims) with Smith 
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding board grossly negligent). 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/10
FELLOWS- READY.DOC 5/20/2004  9:18 PM 
2004] A BUSINESS OR A TRUST?: JANSSEN v. BEST & FLANAGAN  1505 
informed and made in good faith.6 
Without question, the business judgment rule is an important 
component of corporate law.7  For more than a century and a half, 
the business judgment rule has been the primary means by which 
courts have reviewed ordinary board decisions.8  Application of the 
rule, however, is uncertain and full of “nuance and complexity.”9  
The root of this uncertainty is in the delicate balance the rule 
attempts to maintain between board independence and authority 
on one hand and legitimate shareholder claims on the other.10 
Recently, in Janssen v. Best & Flanagan,11 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of how the business judgment 
rule applies to the board of directors of a nonprofit organization.  
The court decided that the business judgment rule does protect 
nonprofit board decisions, but did not reach the issue of which 
particular version of the business judgment rule applies to 
nonprofits in order to decide the case.12  This note uses Janssen as 
 
 6. See infra Part II.A.-C. 
 7. See Michael J. Kennedy, The Business Judgment Syllogism—Premises Governing 
Board Activity, in TECH. & EMERGING GROWTH M&AS 2002 at 285, 327 (PLI Corp. L. 
& Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1316, 2002), available at WL 1316 
PLI/Corp 285 (stating that there are “perhaps thousands” of cases that “peel the 
onion of the business judgment rule’s parameters”). 
 8. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 7 (5th ed. 1998). 
 9. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 287.  See also Henry G. Manne, Our Two 
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (calling the 
business judgment rule “one of the least understood concepts in the entire 
corporate field”). 
 10. See In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 801 A.2d 295, 306 (N.J. 2002). 
To resolve this dispute, we are required to analyze the interplay 
between two established, but sometimes competing, corporate 
doctrines. The first doctrine accords protection to corporate decision-
makers to be free of unwarranted judicial intrusion when making 
business judgments on behalf of the corporation. The second tenet 
recognizes a shareholder’s ability to redress perceived wrongs against 
the corporation by filing a derivative lawsuit when the entity’s 
managers refuse to act. 
Id.  See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563-574 (2003) (contrasting the “shareholder 
primacy” and “director primacy” models of corporate governance); Donald C. 
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 820-22 (2001) 
(presenting a social-cognitive analysis of board members’ balancing of 
independence and accountability). 
 11. 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003). 
 12. See id. at 888 n.5 (“We do not adopt a particular version of the business 
judgment rule for use with Minnesota nonprofit organizations today . . . [because 
3
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an opportunity to explore the underlying justifications of the 
business judgment rule and to recommend a framework for 
applying the rule in future Minnesota cases. 
First, this note develops the history of the shareholder 
derivative lawsuit and special litigation committee.13  In addition, 
the historical roots of the business judgment rule and the 
important modern formulations of the rule are described.14  Next, 
the note discusses and critiques the traditional policy justifications 
for the rule.15  Finally, the facts of the case and the court’s analysis 
are described16 and a new framework for applying the business 
judgment rule to nonprofits is presented and discussed in light of 
Janssen.17  Janssen hints that the deferential, one-step version of the 
business judgment rule still applies to Minnesota for-profit 
corporations.18  Strong economic justifications support this 
position.19  Finally, this note recommends that this deferential 
version of the rule should extend only to nonprofit entities 
displaying salient features in common with for-profit 
corporations.20 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A.  The Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit  
A derivative lawsuit is a vehicle through which a third party 
(often a shareholder) may bring a claim on behalf of a corporation 
or other entity.21  The defendant in a shareholder derivative lawsuit 
is often a present or former director, officer or controlling 
shareholder of the corporation, but may instead be a third party 
 
the] investigation failed the most minimal version of a business judgment 
rule. . . .”). 
 13. See infra Parts II.A.-B. 
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. See infra Part II.D. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Part IV.A. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See infra Part IV.B. 
 21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 455 (7th ed. 1999) (defining derivative action 
as a “suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right belonging to the 
fiduciary”).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (“[A] derivative action brought by one or 
more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or . . . 
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which 
may properly be asserted by it . . . .”). 
4
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against whom the corporation has a possible claim.22  A derivative 
action is different than a direct shareholder or class-action lawsuit 
in that the corporation, and not the shareholder/plaintiff, is the 
real party in interest23 in the action.24 
The origin of the modern derivative action is traced to 
eighteenth century British courts taking equity jurisdiction to 
enforce the fiduciary25 duties of directors of joint stock and 
charitable corporations.26  American courts recognized the concept 
of corporate directors as fiduciaries through an analogy to trusts.  
Early cases allowed shareholder recovery from corporations for 
misused funds.27  Later cases with third-party actors as defendants 
required courts to introduce the concept of derivative actions in 
order to avoid the possibility of dual recovery (by both the 
corporation and the shareholder) for a single injury.28 
While most shareholder derivative actions are dismissed or 
settled before they go to trial,29 the risk of an adverse outcome to 
the corporation is real in both the duty of care30 and duty of 
 
 22. DEBORAH DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 1:01 (2002). 
 23. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70 (5th ed. 1994) 
(defining real party in interest as the party possessing the substantive right to be 
enforced and not necessarily the party who will ultimately benefit from recovery). 
 24. DEMOTT, supra note 22, § 101, at 1-2.  Procedurally, this means that the 
corporation is an indispensable party and the shareholder bringing the action is a 
nominal plaintiff responsible for joining the corporation in the action.  Ross v. 
Bernard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).  See also Koster v. Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. 
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947) (examining the jurisdictional implications of 
properly aligning the adverse parties in a derivative action). 
 25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 640 (defining a fiduciary as 
“one who must exercise a high standard of care in managing another’s money or 
property”; listing specifically the fiduciary duties of “good faith, trust, confidence 
and candor”). 
 26. See generally Bert Prunty, The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its 
Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 981-82 (1957) (tracing the impulse behind the 
derivative action from early efforts by kings and chancellors to protect group 
members against their delegates to its modern American form). 
 27. See, e.g., Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 226 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)  (“if the 
corporation was still under the control of those who must be made the defendants 
in the suit, the stockholders . . . would be permitted to file a bill in their own 
names”); Taylor v. Miami Exp. Co., 5 Ohio 162, 167 (1831) (“if this corporation 
and directors were trustees and agents of the stockholders, can they not call them 
to account for the funds placed under their care[?]”). 
 28. See also Prunty, supra note 26, at 991-92 (discussing these decisions and 
the logical leap taken by courts in allowing shareholders to assert corporate 
rights). 
 29. DEMOTT, supra note 22, § 1:01, at 3. 
 30. In most jurisdictions the current standard of care expected of corporate 
5
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loyalty31 contexts.  From the corporation’s perspective, the adverse 
outcome is forced participation in a lawsuit.  If the 
plaintiff/shareholder brings the suit strictly for nuisance value or in 
hopes that a settlement will be less expensive for the corporation 
than the risk of the lawsuit moving forward, it is termed a “strike 
suit.”32  The law developed the special litigation committee and the 
business judgment rule to provide corporations with efficient 
means to terminate lawsuits running counter to their legitimate 
interests.33 
B.  The Special Litigation Committee  
Starting in the 1970s it became common practice for boards of 
directors to establish a special litigation committee of independent 
directors and to delegate to the committee the decision whether to 
join a derivative lawsuit.34  It is important that the committee be 
granted actual and meaningful authority to decide the matter and 
not merely be empowered to recommend a course of action to the 
board for ultimate approval.35  Special litigation committees are 
 
directors is such care and diligence that an ordinarily careful and prudent person 
could reasonably be expected to exercise on behalf of the corporation under 
similar circumstances.  See 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON 
CORPORATIONS § 10:03 (2d ed. 2003).  In practice this standard of care is 
decreased in the shareholder derivative context because the business judgment 
rule requirements must also be met. 
 31. The duty of loyalty encompasses officer or director self-dealing, conflict-
of-interest transactions, the personal usurping of corporate opportunity and other 
situations where officers or directors act to protect their personal self-interest and 
neglect to serve the interests of the corporation and its stockholders.  1 COX & 
HAZEN, supra note 30, § 10.11, at 517. 
 32. See Dennis J. Block, et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in 
Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 BUS. LAW. 469, 473 (1990) 
(defining “strike suits” as actions brought to “induce settlements beneficial to the 
named plaintiff or his counsel” and not to remedy wrongs done to the 
corporation) (footnote omitted). 
 33. See infra Part II.B-C.  For a treatment of special litigation committees as 
alternative dispute resolution devices, see Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta 
Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or “What’s a Lawsuit Between Friends in an 
‘Incorporated Partnership?’ ” 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 1235 (1996). 
 34. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 30, § 15.08, at 939.  See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon 
Corp. 418 F. Supp. 508, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Indeed, in carrying out its 
investigation and in reaching its conclusions, the Special Committee exercised the 
full powers of the Board.”); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (“If the minority directors were truly disinterested and independent the 
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board.”), rev’d, 567 F.2d 1208 
(2d Cir. 1978),  rev’d and remanded, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
 35. See Lawrence J. Fox, The Special Litigation Committee Investigation: No 
6
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seen as an efficient method of judging the corporate interest in a 
derivative lawsuit when the court may see the decision of the full 
board as colored by self-interest.36  However, the degree to which 
such committees are able to exercise truly independent judgment 
over actions of their board colleagues has been repeatedly 
questioned.37  Nearly all jurisdictions protect independent special 
litigation committee decisions under some formulation of the 
business judgment rule.38 
C.  The Business Judgment Rule  
The business judgment rule is a deferential standard of judicial 
review of corporate director conduct that presumes directors act in 
good faith, on an informed basis, and “in the honest belief that 
their actions are in the corporation’s best interests.”39  This 
presumption protects director conduct that can be attributed to 
any rational business purpose.40  Justice Brandeis succinctly 
 
Undertaking for the Faint of Heart, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 299, 302-
03 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003). 
 36. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 30, § 15.08, at 940. 
 37. This tendency not to deliver negative outcomes onto one’s board of 
director colleagues has been termed “ ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ 
empathy.” Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).  The 
tendency has also been referred to as “structural bias.”  See, e.g., Miller v. Register 
& Tribune Syndicate, Inc. 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983) (“The central theme 
of these concerns has been focused on the ‘structural bias’ approach, which 
suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that the members of independent 
committees are free from personal, financial or moral influences which flow from 
the directors who appoint them.”). 
 38. Iowa is the most notable exception.  Iowa does not provide deferential 
review of special litigation committee decisions.  Instead, the corporation is 
required to apply for a court-appointed panel, thereby avoiding “structural bias,” 
in order to be protected under the business judgment rule.  See Matthew G. Dore, 
The Duties and Liabilities of an Iowa Corporate Director, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 207, 240 
(2002). 
 39. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 192.  The business judgment 
rule began to appear in court decisions in essentially its modern form in the mid 
nineteenth century in the United States.  See, e.g., In re Spering, 71 Pa. 11, 24 
(1872) (“they are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be so 
gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and 
provided they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to 
the managing body”).  See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN 
LAW, 1836-1937, 59-63 (1991) (tracing the historical development of shareholder 
derivative suits and the business judgment rule). 
 40. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A 
board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its 
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business 
purpose.  A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of 
7
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formulated the business judgment rule as follows: 
Courts seldom interfere to control such discretion intra 
vires the corporation, except where the directors are 
guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or 
where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an 
unprejudiced exercise of judgment; and, as a rule, only 
after application to the stockholders, unless it appears 
that there was no opportunity for such application, that 
such application would be futile (as where the 
wrongdoers control the corporation), or that the delay 
involved would defeat recovery.41 
To be successful, a plaintiff must plead and prove sufficient 
facts to overcome this presumption.42  Where the business 
judgment rule presumption is overcome by the plaintiff, the 
directors bear the burden of proving the fairness of the conduct 
being challenged.43  In practice, the difference between deferential 
review in light of the presumption in favor of directors and more 
rigorous review requiring that directors prove fairness often 
determines the outcome of derivative litigation.44 
The business judgment rule places emphasis on the board’s 
decision-making process rather than on the substance of the 
decision.45  The fact that a majority of independent and 
disinterested directors has approved of board action nearly always 
means that a court will apply the deferential business judgment 
standard of review if the action is later attacked for a breach of the 
duty of care.46 
Deferential business judgment review is a broadly accepted 
 
what is or is not sound business judgment.”). 
 41. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-
64 (1917) (footnote omitted). 
 42. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 18 (5th ed. 1998). 
 43. Id. at 18-19. 
 44. Id. at 19. 
 45. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997) (“It applies when 
that decision is questioned and the analysis is primarily a process inquiry.  Courts 
give deference to directors’ decisions reached by a proper process, and do not 
apply an objective reasonableness test in such a case to examine the wisdom of the 
decision itself.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 46. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988), overruled on different 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). “We view a board of 
directors with a majority of outside directors, such as this Board, as being in the 
nature of overseers of management.”  Id. 
8
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common law concept47 accepted as a presumption in the 
influential48 state of Delaware49 and at least twenty-five other 
jurisdictions50 including Minnesota,51 Iowa,52and Wisconsin.53  Two 
distinct business judgment rule philosophies have emerged that 
come to different conclusions about the scope of judicial review 
under the rule and the conditions under which a corporate board 
can terminate a shareholder derivative lawsuit.54 
1.  New York’s One-Step Approach 
New York’s approach, exemplified in Auerbach v. Bennett, is the 
most deferential in that it trusts decisions by disinterested directors 
 
 47. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31, Note on Directors’ Liability (2000) 
(“this standard of judicial review for director conduct—deeply rooted in the case 
law—presumes that, absent self-dealing or other breach of the duty of loyalty, 
directors’ decision-making satisfies the applicable legal requirements”). 
 48. Delaware precedent in corporate law matters is very influential in forming 
what some commentators call the “corporate judiciary” and is heavily cited in 
other jurisdictions.  DAVID SCIULI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY 15 (2001).  
New York, New Jersey, and California are other influential jurisdictions in this 
regard.  Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“It is a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) 
(“Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the 
fundamental principle . . . that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation 
are managed by or under its board of directors.”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
141(a)). 
 50. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 22-24 (listing jurisdictions that accept the 
business judgment rule presumption and providing citations to cases). 
 51. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986) 
(“Under Minnesota law, there is a strong presumption protecting a director’s 
business decision.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 811 F.2d 414 
(8th Cir. 1987); Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1982) (stating that 
“we have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with the inner workings of a 
corporation”). 
 52. Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 
447, 453 (Iowa 1988) (holding that “in duty of care challenges the burden of 
proof is on plaintiffs because of the business judgment rule which affords directors 
the presumption that their decisions are informed, made in good faith, and 
honestly believed by them to be in the best interests of the company”). 
 53. R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Wis. 1986) 
(“If plaintiffs are able to prove their allegations that the board’s consideration of 
alternatives was merely perfunctory, this would mean that defendants did not meet 
their duty of good faith and reasonable investigation.”). 
 54. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1689-1702 (providing a comprehensive 
review of business judgment rule litigation including numerous citations). 
9
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whether to pursue derivative claims as long as the decision is 
preceded by a good-faith investigation.55  The court explains that 
judges are especially qualified to review the investigative 
procedures undertaken by a board or committee.56  However, the 
substantive decision to terminate the lawsuit “involving as it did the 
weighing and balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional, 
public relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolution 
of many if not most corporate problems” is beyond the scope of 
judicial review.57 
The appropriate scope of review of board investigatory 
procedures under the Auerbach standard can be gleaned from the 
decision.58  The court notes that the board committee “promptly 
engaged eminent special counsel to guide its deliberations and to 
advise it” and “reviewed the prior work of the audit committee, 
testing its completeness, accuracy and thoroughness by 
interviewing representatives” of the outside auditors.59  The 
committee also reviewed “transcripts of the testimony of 10 
corporate officers and employees before the Securities and 
Exchange Commission” and reviewed documents collected during 
an earlier investigation conducted by a law firm.60  Finally, 
“[i]ndividual interviews were conducted with the directors found to 
have participated in any way” in the questioned activities and 
“[q]uestionnaires were sent to and answered by each of the 
corporation’s nonmanagement directors.”61  While stating that the 
court’s determination of which investigative methods are 
appropriate and sufficient “must always turn on the nature and 
characteristics of the particular subject being investigated,” the 
court found nothing in the record to “raise a triable issue of fact as 
to the good-faith pursuit of its examination by that committee.”62 
 
 55. 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979) (“While the court may properly inquire 
as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee’s investigative 
procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration of 
such factors trespass in the domain of business judgment.”). 
 56. Id.  (“[C]ourts are well equipped by long and continuing experience and 
practice . . . . In fact they are better qualified in this regard than are corporate 
directors in general.”). 
 57. Id. at 1002 (“Inquiry into such matters would go to the very core of the 
business judgment made by the committee.”). 
 58. See id. at 1003. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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The Auerbach standard of judicial review of board decisions is a 
one-step process in that the investigative procedures, but not the 
substance of the decision, are analyzed by the court.63  Under this 
philosophy, to delve into the substance of corporate decisions 
“would be to emasculate the business judgment doctrine as applied 
to the actions and determinations of the special litigation 
committee.”64 
2.  Delaware’s Two-Step Approach 
Delaware’s philosophy on judicial review, laid out in Zapata 
Corp. v. Maldonado, is less deferential in that it gives the court 
discretion to exercise its own “independent business judgment” 
whether to dismiss the case.65  Step one under Zapata requires the 
court to “inquire into the independence and good faith of the 
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.”66  Instead of 
receiving the traditional business-judgment presumption in its 
favor, the board has the burden of establishing the independence, 
good faith, and reasonableness of the committee’s determination.67  
If the corporation meets this burden, the court has a choice to 
either 1) dismiss the action68 or 2) move into step two of the test.69 
In step two, the court “should determine, applying its own 
independent business judgment, whether the motion should be 
granted.”70  This step considers the balance between “legitimate 
corporate claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit” and 
 
 63. Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23 (1993) 
(stating if a litigation committee is disinterested and follows appropriate 
procedures, Auerbach prevents a court from examining the merits of the board’s 
decision). 
 64. Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1002. 
 65. 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981). 
 66. Id. at 788. 
 67. Id. (stating that “the moving party should be prepared to meet the 
normal burden under [Delaware Chancery Court] Rule 56 that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
dismiss as a matter of law”). 
 68. Id. at 789 (“If the Court determines either that the committee is not 
independent or has not shown reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the 
Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but not 
limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the corporation’s 
motion.”). 
 69. Id. (“If, however, the Court is satisfied . . . that the committee was 
independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith findings and 
recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its discretion, to the next step.”). 
 70. Id. 
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the best interest of the corporation as expressed by the 
independent committee.71  At this stage, the court should consider 
instances where the corporate actions meet the criteria of step one 
but the “result does not appear to satisfy its spirit.”72  The court may 
also weigh “matters of law and public policy in addition to the 
corporation’s best interests.”73  Step two reflects the Zapata court’s 
concern with respecting the power of a board to run the business 
of a corporation while at the same time allowing meritorious 
shareholder lawsuits to go forward.74 
It is important to note that Delaware only applies the Zapata 
approach to judicial review in cases where shareholder demand75 is 
excused due to futility or wrongful refusal.76  Where demand is 
rightly refused due to the sufficient independence of the board, 
Delaware provides corporate boards the full protection of the 
business judgment rule.77  In practice, applying the second Zapata 
step may amount to overruling a board decision that seems 
“egregious” or “irrational” even though board independence and 
good faith satisfy step one.78 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 788 (“We thus steer a middle course between those cases which yield 
to the independent business judgment of a board committee and this case as 
determined below which would yield to unbridled plaintiff stockholder control.”). 
 75. In order to have standing to initiate derivative litigation, a shareholder 
must first demand in writing that the board of directors commence the lawsuit in 
question.  BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1407 (defining “shareholder demand” and 
noting that its purpose is to limit derivative litigation to situations where the 
corporation unjustly failed to act for itself). 
 76. Demand futility is essentially a determination that the board of directors 
is insufficiently disinterested and independent to be trusted to make a decision in 
the best interests of the corporation.  See, e.g., McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 
193 (Del. Ch. 1931) (stating that “the officers are under an influence that sterilizes 
discretion and could not be proper persons to conduct the litigation”).  See also 
DEL. R. CH. CT. 23.1 (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, 
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the 
directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the 
action or for not making the effort.”) (emphasis added). 
 77. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784 (stating that “[c]onsistent with the purpose of 
requiring a demand, a board decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as 
detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and refused, will be 
respected unless it was wrongful”). 
 78. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1720 (citing Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice 
Int’l Holdings, Inc., No. CIV.A.13950, 1997 WL 305829, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 30, 
1997)). 
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3.  Minnesota’s Historical Approach 
Minnesota courts historically have used the Auerbach one-step 
approach to review board of director decisions.79  Until 1989, one-
step review for independence and good faith in the special 
litigation committee context was mandated by statute.80  In 1989, 
the statute was repealed and its replacement did not address the 
degree of deference to be afforded to special litigation committee 
decisions.81  Subsequent court of appeals decisions refused to apply 
a more stringent standard of review despite the statutory changes.82  
One-step review for independence and good faith remained the 
standard in Minnesota notwithstanding some plaintiff arguments 
that the standard should be strengthened in the direction of the 
Zapata two-step approach that allows the court to review the 
reasonableness of the decision.83 
D.  Justifications of the Rule  
The ultimate purpose that is served by the business judgment 
rule is striking a balance between the authority of the board of 
directors and its accountability to other stakeholders.84  The 
context of the derivative action sharpens the focus on this balance: 
it is the corporate entity and not the nominal plaintiff that has 
suffered the alleged wrong.85  Therefore, it follows that it should be 
within the province of an independent board of directors to decide 
whether or not to seek redress in the courts.  Unlike in a direct 
 
 79. See, e.g., Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988). 
 80. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.243 (1988) (“The good faith determinations of the 
committee are binding upon the corporation and its directors, officers, and 
shareholders.”), repealed by 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 172, § 11. 
 81. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 subd. 1 (2003). 
 82. See, e.g., Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
(stating that the repealing of section 302A.243 “was not intended to convey any 
legislative intent with regard to the substance of the repealed section”).  But see 
Moutz, supra note 2, at 497 (arguing that legislative intent associated with the 
repeal of section 302A.243 “[a]t the very least” requires courts to “substantively 
consider alternatives to Auerbach”). 
 83. See Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 507-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) 
(rejecting plaintiff arguments that rely on decisions from jurisdictions applying 
more stringent standards of review), see also Moutz, supra note 2, at 511 
(advocating that Minnesota adopt the Zapata approach). 
 84. See STEPHAN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 208 (2002) 
(noting the “tension between authority and accountability” inherent in 
questioning board of director decisions and actions). 
 85. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1380. 
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lawsuit, corporate stakeholders have the option to “vote with their 
feet” and dissociate themselves from the situation.86 
Within the essential tension between authority and 
accountability, several specific theoretical justifications for the 
business judgment rule emerge. 
1.  Encouraging Directors to Serve  
Courts have repeatedly recognized that even informed, well-
intentioned directors can make decisions that, with the benefit of 
hindsight, later appear misguided.87  If each incident of human 
fallibility in board decisionmaking that results in a negative 
outcome were to lead to personal liability for the individual board 
members, it is easy to see that competent individuals might be 
discouraged from accepting board positions.88  This is especially 
true given the massive scale of operation of many modern 
corporations; director actions later judged grossly negligent with 
the benefit of hindsight could lead to massive joint and several 
liability for the entire loss.89 
 
 86. Shareholders in closely held corporations are not an exception although 
they would seem to be without the necessary liquidity to be able to “vote with their 
feet.”  However, they are protected by Minnesota closely held corporation law 
under a completely different and much less deferential standard.  See Kleinberger 
& Bergmanis, supra note 33, at 1238 (“Minnesota’s leading close corporation cases 
have featured egregious conduct and overwhelming evidence, and the decisions 
exhibit none of the deference to management that characterizes business 
judgment cases.”).  Employee-owned stock may be under alienation restrictions 
that prevent exiting in the face of corporate wrongdoing.  See Moutz, supra note 2, 
at 508-09. However, employee stock ownership does not carry with it the 
assumption of diversification that is one of the important foundations of the 
business judgment rule.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
 87. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 12 (citing numerous cases that mention 
this justification for the business judgment rule). 
 88. A powerful example of this concern is reflected in the 1986 revision of 
title 8, section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code to allow corporate bylaws to 
exempt directors from liability for duty-of-care violations under certain 
circumstances.  See Diane L. Saltoun, Note, Fortifying the Directorial Stronghold: 
Delaware Limits Director Liability, 29 B.C. L. REV. 481, 481-82 (1988).  See also Smith v. 
Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors were 
personally liable for gross negligence for approving a merger without reasonable 
investigation). 
 89. See William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due 
Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a 
Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 457 (2002) (arguing risk/reward 
ratio for directors discourages board service and risk-taking). 
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2.  Protecting Risk-Taking  
Shareholders (or at least economically rational shareholders) 
depend upon corporate growth and do not want directors to 
behave in a risk-averse manner.90  Accordingly, courts appreciate 
that risk-taking and innovation are important elements of 
economic growth.91  Without the threat of personal liability, 
directors are free to honestly and rationally assess the risk involved 
with any given opportunity and react accordingly.92  The fact that 
investors are able to diversify their portfolio of investments and the 
associated risks is additional justification for protecting director 
risk-taking in individual corporations.93 
3.  Courts Are Ill-Equipped  
Courts reviewing board of director decisions often justify their 
deference by stating that they are ill-equipped to second-guess an 
informed board of directors.94  Judges often argue that they lack 
special expertise and specific history with the corporation in 
question or that they are missing an intangible “sense” for the 
business and the particular marketplace.95  The business judgment 
rule, from this perspective, protects board decisions because of the 
special expertise of the directors and the relative lack of expertise 
 
 90. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(noting that shareholders should prefer investments that maximize the “risk 
adjusted rate of return”). 
 91. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 930 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Ariz. 
1994) (“[O]ur country’s corporate system depends to a degree on the willingness 
of corporations to take risk.”). 
 92. Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (stating that, given the scale of corporate 
activities, even a small probability of liability has a significant chilling effect on 
director risk taking).  See also Allen, supra note 89, at 456-57 (arguing the massive 
scale of potential liability inhibits risk-taking among directors). 
 93. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation,  698 A.2d 959, 968 
n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The corporate form gets its utility in large part from its 
ability to allow diversified investors to accept greater investment risk.”); see also 
Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and 
Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179, 205 
(2001) (arguing the business judgment rule appropriately lessens board concern 
with minimizing diversifiable risk). 
 94. See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (review “would expose directors to 
substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries”); Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630 (“the business judgment doctrine . . . is grounded in 
the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to 
evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments”). 
 95. See Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment 
Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637 (2002). 
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of judges.96 
However, the premise that courts should grant deferential 
review based upon a lack of specific expertise has been criticized on 
the grounds that courts are willing to more strictly review decisions 
in other complex domains, such as medical malpractice.97  Other 
commentators argue that courts are ill-equipped based not upon a 
lack of expertise, but rather because of the dangers of hindsight 
bias and the lack of objective standards against which to evaluate 
business decisions.98 
III. THE JANSSEN DECISION 
A.  Facts 
The board of directors of the Minneapolis Police Relief 
Association99 (MPRA) in 1996 and 1997 lost approximately $15 
million in an investment in a company known as Technimar.100  
George Janssen and other members of MPRA (hereinafter Janssen) 
brought a derivative lawsuit on behalf of MPRA against the law firm 
of Best & Flanagan, which advised the MPRA board of directors.101  
Among other claims, the lawsuit alleged that the Best & Flanagan 
attorneys who served as general counsel to MPRA were negligent in 
failing to conduct a “due diligence” inquiry into the Technimar 
investment.102 
As a response to the lawsuit, the MPRA board issued a 
resolution appointing attorney Robert Murnane as “special 
 
 96. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *29 
(Del.Ch. July 14, 1989) (stating the designation of authority to the board to make 
business and financial decisions is one of the “important benefits of the business 
judgment rule”). 
 97. See Jeffrey O’Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice 
Claims Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 426 
(2002) (“Much of the reasoning that supports the existence of the business 
judgment rule likewise applies to health care and other enterprises.”). 
 98. See William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of 
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1296 (2001) (hindsight 
bias); Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance—The Role of Special Litigation 
Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 91 (1993) (“no available objective standard”). 
 99. MPRA is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation governed by a board of nine 
directors that administers a pension plan for Minneapolis police officers hired 
before June 15, 1980.  See MINN. STAT. § 423B.01-.04 (2002). 
 100. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2003). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 879-80. 
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counsel” to investigate Janssen’s claims.103  The resolution 
instructed Murnane to conduct an independent review of the 
derivative lawsuit and determine on behalf of the board of directors 
whether MPRA should join the lawsuit against Best & Flanagan.104  
In particular, the resolution instructed Murnane “not to 
reinvestigate, verify or otherwise attempt to prove or disprove the 
factual findings, determinations, events or circumstances” 
described in two previous investigative reports and a set of 
discovery materials from a related lawsuit.105  Murnane was not 
limited by the conclusions of the previous reports, but was 
specifically instructed to “accept as correct” their factual findings.106 
Over the next few months Murnane reviewed “thousands of 
pages of reports, documents and deposition transcripts” while 
investigating the prospects of a malpractice lawsuit against Best & 
Flanagan.107  Murnane did not, however, conduct any of his own 
investigation nor speak to the Janssen claimants and attorneys.108  
The report Murnane submitted to the MPRA board of directors on 
September 26, 2000, concluded that “the totality of the materials 
reviewed does not support a finding that Best & Flanagan 
committed legal malpractice in its handling of the MPRA affairs” 
and that “to spend money in the pursuit of a legal malpractice 
claim against Best & Flanagan would not be prudent use of the 
 
 103. Id. at 880.  While the board resolution labeled Murnane’s role as that of  
“special counsel,” their ultimate intention was that he provide an independent 
business judgment in the role of the board’s independent special litigation 
committee.  See infra Part III.B.2.A.  The distinction between serving as “special 
counsel” and as a special litigation committee is potentially significant because a 
role as board counsel implies a possible past and/or future role in advising the 
board and a particular fiduciary relationship with the directors themselves that 
could color the independence of the counsel or committee’s conclusions.  See 
James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside 
Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1084-85 (2003) (“earlier, 
and particularly on-going, representation of the corporation raises questions 
regarding independence and, hence, possible biasing of the information and 
advice counsel may provide the committee”).  The advice provided by legal 
counsel may also be considered more limited in scope than that provided by a 
special litigation committee responsible for providing a “business judgment.”  See 
Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 (“instead MPRA hired Murnane to serve as its special 
counsel and he acted more like a legal advisor than a neutral decision maker”). 
 104. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 880. 
 105. Id.  Two different law firms, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (Jones Day) and 
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (Dorsey Whitney), already had conducted investigations 
surrounding some of the issues and provided the written reports.  Id. at 879. 
 106. Id. at 880. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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MPRA funds.”109  The MPRA board then brought a motion to 
dismiss the Janssen lawsuit on the theory that the court should 
defer to the business judgment of Murnane who served as the 
board’s special litigation committee.110 
The district court accepted Murnane as a special litigation 
committee and applied the business judgment rule to his report.111  
The court tested Murnane’s investigation for independence and 
good faith and concluded that the investigation failed even this 
limited standard of review.112  The court found Murnane’s 
investigation lacked independence because “he was told by the 
board of directors what to believe.”113  The court did not find good 
faith because Murnane did not seek or receive input from the 
plaintiffs.114  In addition, the district court noted that it could not 
determine whether Murnane offered legal advice or a business 
judgment decision to the MPRA board.115 
Instead of denying MPRA’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the 
district court postponed decision on the motion to allow MPRA to 
modify the delegation of authority to its special litigation 
committee.116  The court stated that it would not grant business 
judgment deference to the committee’s decision “until adequate 
evidence of independence and good faith is submitted by the 
MPRA, and until it is clear that Murnane has rendered a business 
judgment.”117 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  The district court appears to apply a strict version of the business 
judgment rule (following the Auerbach one-step approach) by only examining the 
investigative procedures undertaken by the special litigation committee.  See id. 
(“[the district court] examined only whether the committee conducted its 
investigation with independence and good faith). 
 113. Id.  The district court concluded that the investigation lacked 
independence because the board gave Murnane “only limited access to 
information.”  Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 645 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002) [hereinafter “Janssen Appeal”]. 
 114. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 880. (“the [district] court was left to assume that 
such input was not sought because the board’s instructions limited the scope of 
the investigation”). 
 115. Id.  Operating as a “special counsel” offering legal advice does not meet 
the standard of neutrality and independence required of a special litigation 
committee of the board.  See id. at 888. 
 116. Id. at 880-81.  The court postponed a decision on the motion to allow 
Murnane a second chance to investigate and not merely as a time extension to 
supplement the record.  See id. at 889 n.6. 
 117. Id. at 881. 
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As a result, the MPRA board issued a second resolution in 
December of 2000 declaring that Murnane was to function as a 
special litigation committee, that no limits be imposed on his 
investigation, and asking that Murnane exercise his business 
judgment about whether it was in the best interest of MPRA to join 
in the derivative lawsuit.118  Murnane undertook a second 
investigation during which he met with some of the plaintiffs and 
the involved attorneys at Best & Flanagan.119  Murnane’s second 
report concluded that it would be a “poor business judgment” for 
MPRA to join in the lawsuit against Best & Flanagan.120  MPRA then 
renewed its motion to dismiss the derivative lawsuit.121  The district 
court concluded that the special litigation committee’s second 
investigation was conducted independently and in good faith.122  
The court deferred to Murnane’s business judgment according to 
the business judgment rule and granted MPRA’s motion to dismiss 
the lawsuit against Best & Flanagan.123 
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that 
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act124 does not authorize 
nonprofit organizations to create and empower special litigation 
committees.125  The court of appeals also stated that, even assuming 
MPRA could legally form a special litigation committee, Murnane’s 
initial report failed the independence and good faith requirements 
and the court would not have deferred to the committee’s findings 
even after the second investigation and report.126  The stated 
deficiencies were that 1) the scope of Murnane’s investigation was 
limited by the MPRA board, 2) Murnane failed to interview the 
plaintiffs, and 3) Murnane’s conclusions amounted to legal advice 
rather than business judgment.127 
 
 118. The second resolution grants Murnane “complete independence” and 
states that he “may undertake whatever good faith investigation he chooses.”  Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 subd. 1 (2002).  See also discussion infra note 142. 
 125. Janssen Appeal, 645 N.W.2d at 498 (“authorizing the use of special 
litigation committees by for-profit corporations and omitting any reference to 
them for nonprofit corporations is a clear statement of legislative intent to treat 
the business entities differently in this aspect of management”). 
 126. See id. at 500 (concluding that the two Murnane investigations considered 
together failed the independence and good faith requirements). 
 127. Id. at 499-500 (listing the three district court findings on which the court 
of appeals based its conclusion). 
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Analysis  
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals 
decision128 that Murnane’s investigation did not meet the business 
judgment threshold.129  The supreme court decided the case in 
three steps.  The first step was determining whether the deferential 
business judgment standard of review should be applied to board 
of director decisions in a nonprofit corporation.130  The second was 
deciding whether the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act131 
prohibits a board of directors from establishing a special litigation 
committee with authority to make decisions about derivative 
litigation.132  The third decision was whether Murnane, serving as 
MPRA’s special litigation committee, displayed sufficient 
independence and good faith to warrant the deferential standard 
of review of the business judgment rule.133 
1.  Nonprofits and the Business Judgment Rule 
The court began by noting the balance that must be 
maintained between the important goals of allowing a corporation 
to control its own destiny and holding directors accountable by 
allowing derivative lawsuits.134  The two traditional justifications for 
the business judgment standard are: 1) shielding directors’ 
reasonable risks is economically desirable to allow businesses to 
attract risk-averse managers and adapt to changing markets and 
trends,135 and 2) courts are generally ill-equipped to judge the 
merits of business decisions.136 
All parties in the case presumed that the business judgment 
rule would apply, and the court found no authority denying a 
nonprofit corporation business judgment protection.137  The court 
 
 128. Janssen Appeal, 645 N.W.2d at 500. 
 129. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 890. 
 130. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 131. MINN. STAT. ch. 317A (2002). 
 132. See authorities cited infra note 142. 
 133. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 134. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 881-82 (citing In re PSE & G S’holder Litig., 801 
A.2d 295, 306 (N.J. 2002)). 
 135. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 136. See supra Part II.D.3. 
 137. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883 (citing Fairhope Single Tax Corp. v. Rezner, 
527 So. 2d 1232, 1236 (Ala. 1987); Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Employees’ Ret. Sys., 
952 P.2d 1215, 1226-27 (Haw. 1998); Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621 N.W.2d 150, 
154 (S.D. 2001); Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316, 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); 
20
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argued that, like for-profit corporations, nonprofits are 
autonomous agents deserving to “control their own destiny.”138  
Additionally, directors of nonprofits “may take fewer risks than 
would be optimal” if they had too much concern for liability for 
well-intentioned decisions,139 and that courts are no better 
equipped to second-guess nonprofit board decisions than for-profit 
board decisions.140  Finally, the court reasoned that judges should 
no more insert themselves between disputing factions of nonprofits 
than between dissatisfied shareholders and boards of for-profit 
corporations.141  Concluding that the two business judgment rule 
justifications presented earlier apply in the nonprofit context as 
well, the court held that nonprofit boards are also protected by the 
rule.142 
2.  Applying the Business Judgment Standard 
The court separately addressed the first board resolution and 
investigation and the second resolution and investigation allowed 
by the district court.143 
a.  First Investigation 
The court set out the “minimum” standard that must be met in 
 
Scheuer Family Found. Inc. v. 61 Assoc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992); Soloman v. Edgewater Yacht Club. Inc., 519 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ohio Mun. 
1987); Dockside Ass’n, Inc. v. Detyens, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987); 
Burke v. Tenn. Walking Horse Breeders’ & Exhibitors’ Ass’n, No. 01A01-9611-CH-
0511, 1997 WL 277999 at *9, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 
795, 801-02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)). 
 138. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883. 
 139. Id.  See also supra Part II.D.2. 
 140. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883.  See also supra Part II.D.3. 
 141. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883. 
 142. Id.  The supreme court also reversed the court of appeals holding that 
nonprofit boards are not permitted to grant authority to special litigation 
committees.  Id. at 884.  The Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act states that 
committees appointed by a nonprofit board are “subject at all times to the 
direction and control of the board.”  MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 subd. 1 (2002).  This 
language would appear to prohibit granting the type of authority necessary to 
establish independence in the business judgment rule context.  See Janssen, 662 
N.W.2d at 885 (noting that a strict reading would “make true independence 
impossible”).  In construing the statute, the court reasoned that there are “no 
characteristics of nonprofits that justify treating nonprofit and for-profit 
corporations differently in terms of their ability to delegate board authority.”  Id. 
at 886. 
 143. See supra Part III.A. 
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order for a litigation committee decision to deserve protection 
under the business judgment rule.144  The committee must act in 
good faith and with sufficient independence from the board to 
dispassionately review the derivative lawsuit.145  Filling a “mere 
advisory role” is not enough: the board must delegate to the 
committee the full power to control the litigation.146 
The court noted two aspects of Murnane’s initial investigation 
to illustrate that he lacked sufficient independence from the 
board.147  First, the resolution explicitly restricted the scope of his 
factual investigation.148  Murnane was told to rely on facts 
developed during other law firms’ earlier investigations of related 
legal issues.149  Second, the court concluded that Murnane saw his 
role as being determined by the title “special counsel” rather than 
as a special litigation committee tasked to provide an independent 
business judgment that would bind the board.150  Supporting this 
conclusion is the fact that Murnane did not interview Janssen or his 
counsel.151  The court noted that Murnane’s conclusions sounded 
like legal advice rather than business judgment.152 
Two features of Murnane’s procedures pointed to a lack of 
good faith investigation.153  First, he failed “a fundamental task in 
reaching an informed decision” by never interviewing Janssen or 
 
 144. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888.  The court does not adopt a particular version 
of the business judgment rule in its analysis.  Instead, it applies the “good faith” 
and “independence” tests as elements common to all state “variations” upon the 
rule.  Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (calling delegation of power to control the litigation a “key factor in 
evaluating independence”). 
 147. Id.  The court analyzed independence and good faith as a conjunctive test 
with two parts, but applied some facts about the investigation to both the 
independence and good faith parts of the test.  See supra notes 109-119 and 
accompanying text. 
 148. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  The court does not give a definitive indication of the characteristics 
that define “legal advice” versus an “independent business judgment.”  However, it 
appears that business judgment must at least consider information from the 
perspective of other parties outside of the board and must consider a broader 
range of factors relevant to operating a business in making a decision.  See infra 
note 157. 
 153. The court defines the good faith element as requiring “a good faith 
attempt to deduce the best interest of MPRA with respect to the litigation against 
Best & Flanagan.”  Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 889. 
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his counsel.154  Second, Murnane failed to consider “all of the 
germane benefits and detriments” of this litigation for MPRA.155  
Murnane concluded that the materials reviewed “do[] not support 
a finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal malpractice” and 
that spending money in pursuit of a malpractice claim “would not 
be prudent use of MPRA funds.”156  The court viewed this as the 
“language . . . of a special counsel evaluating the likelihood of a 
legal victory” instead of a “much more comprehensive weighing 
and balancing of factors” expected in “reasoned business 
decisions.”157  Based upon these arguments, the court held that 
Murnane’s initial investigation “lacked the independence and good 
faith necessary to merit deference from this court.”158 
b.  Second Investigation 
Although the district court deferred MPRA’s motion to dismiss 
and allowed its board to issue a second resolution and empower 
Murnane to conduct a second investigation, the supreme court 
refused to consider the second, “improved” investigation.159  
Although finding no directly relevant precedent, the court argued 
that procedure dictates a derivative lawsuit should proceed to trial 
if the board fails to meet its burden of proving independence and 
good faith.160  The court stated that an investigation that is so 
restricted in scope or so shallow as to constitute a pretext raises 
questions of good faith and “would never be shielded” by the 
business judgment rule.161 
The court found a second justification for refusing to consider 
the second investigation in the principles behind the business 
judgment rule.162  The rule attempts to strike a balance between 
allowing corporations to control their own destiny and permitting 
meritorious shareholder lawsuits to go forward.163  The court 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
 157. Id. (listing factors appropriately considered such as how joining or 
quashing the lawsuit could affect: 1) MPRA’s economic health, 2) member/board 
relations, 3) public relations, and 4) other factors common to reasoned business 
decisions). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 890. 
 160. Id. at 889 (citing Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (Mass. 1990)). 
 161. Id. (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (N.Y. 1979)). 
 162. Id. at 889-90. 
 163. Id. at 890 (citing Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508 (Del. Ch. 1984)). 
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argued that allowing boards “to continually improve their 
investigation to bolster their business decision” creates a situation 
where shareholder rights are “effectively nullified.”164  The court 
concluded that the district court erred in deferring the motion to 
dismiss and permitting the board to remedy defects in their 
delegation of authority to Murnane.165 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A.  For-Profit Review: Hints of Auerbach  
While declining to formally adopt any particular version of the 
business judgment rule, the supreme court in Janssen leaves some 
significant hints that it favors the deferential Auerbach one-step 
approach.166  The first hint is in the reasoning the court uses to 
reject consideration of the MPRA’s second resolution and 
Murnane’s second investigation.167  The court presents very strict 
procedural requirements in its “one strike and you are out” holding 
and equates flaws in a committee investigation with the 
investigation itself being merely pretextual and, therefore, 
unworthy of judicial deference.168  The fact that the court takes 
such a strong procedural stand is possibly indicative of a preference 
for the (strictly procedural) Auerbach formulation of the business 
judgment rule.169  A court leaning toward the Zapata formulation of 
the rule can afford to be less strict in reviewing the investigative 
procedures because optional review of the substance of the 
decision for reasonableness is available.170  In contrast, Auerbach 
 
 164. Id.  This argument applies to any requirement that is purely procedural 
because the procedure can be continually modified and improved while the 
substance of the decision remains the same.  Therefore, if the court defers 
decision on the motion to dismiss while the board continually refines the 
investigative procedures until they meet court scrutiny, the plaintiff will never have 
a chance to bring the suit forward. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 167. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
 168. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 889 (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 
1003 (N.Y. 1979)). 
 169. In contrast, the dissent argues that the second resolution and 
investigation are completely appropriate by appealing to an analogy to summary 
judgment motions generally; denial does not become “law of the case” that 
precludes a renewed motion.  Id. at 890 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 170. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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review provides no such “back up plan.”171 
The second hint that the court is oriented toward deferential, 
one-step review is contained in the language the court uses in 
refusing to adopt a particular standard of review for nonprofit 
board decisions.172  The court states that it “need not reach the 
question of whether a more exacting standard of judicial review 
may be appropriate for nonprofit corporations than in the case of 
for-profit corporations.”173  There are certainly other ways that this 
proposition could be phrased that would not so strongly imply that 
for-profit boards are currently entitled to deferential review.  The 
consistent use of one-step review in court of appeals decisions 
serves as the context for this statement by the supreme court.174 
Given the emphasis that the court places on board 
autonomy,175 deferential review is the appropriate standard for 
Minnesota for-profit corporations.  While a hot-button corporate 
issue or particularly compelling facts may tempt a court to reach 
beyond one-step business judgment review and address the 
substance of the board’s decision, it is important to remember the 
statutory command that “[t]he business and affairs of a corporation 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board.”176  Similar 
corporate constituency statutes exist in most states and, when 
respected, represent the legal foundation for the tremendous 
economic growth that has occurred in the United States.177  
Deferential, one-step review properly respects this statutory 
concession of authority to the board.  It also promotes appropriate 
risk-taking by individual board members and healthy group 
processes by the board acting in concert.178 
 
 171. See supra Part II.C.1.  Other commentators have criticized the Janssen 
“one-strike” approach as inconsistent with the business judgment rule underlying 
purpose of preserving board autonomy.  See Moutz, supra note 2, at 506 (“courts 
should have the discretion to permit additional investigations . . . provided that 
the committee proceeded independently and in good faith”). 
 172. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 n.5. 
 173. Id.  The implication is that less exacting review is appropriate in the case 
of for-profit corporations. 
 174. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 175. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 881-82. 
 176. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201 subd. 1 (2002). 
 177. See Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1565, 1595-96 (1993) (discussing generally the relationship between 
corporate legal structures and long-term economic growth in the United States). 
 178. See discussion supra Part II.D.1-2 (discussing risk taking by individual 
board members); see also Stephan M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group 
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50 (2002). 
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The Janssen decision hints that Minnesota still applies one-step 
review to for-profit board decisions.  For the sound economic 
reasons listed above, the court should confirm those hints by 
applying deferential business judgment review when provided the 
opportunity in the future. 
B.  Nonprofit Review: A Business or a Trust?  
In deciding to apply the business judgment rule to Minnesota 
nonprofits, the court invokes the rule justifications that 1) risk-
taking should be encouraged and 2) courts are ill-equipped to 
review board decisions.179  The court also notes that organizations 
are autonomous agents that should be allowed to control their own 
destiny.180  It appears that the court is arguing that nonprofit and 
for-profit entities are so similar with respect to characteristics that 
are relevant to applying the business judgment rule that the rule 
should apply to both.181  The problem with this argument is the fact 
that nonprofit entities are extremely diverse: some nonprofits 
operate very much like for-profits and some are quite different.182 
 
In turn, risk-averse directors take excessive precautions and avoid risky 
decisions. If the risk of shareholder litigation causes some members of 
the team to exercise more care than is optimal, the team must now 
monitor not only the quality of the decision-making inputs coming from 
each member, but also the risk that any given member is unusually risk 
averse and thus especially subject to having his or her inputs into the 
team processes skewed by the fear of liability. 
Id. 
 179. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883. 
 180. Id. (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01 (N.Y. 1979)). 
 181. These characteristics of nonprofits and for-profits are the ones that relate 
to the traditional justifications for the business judgment rule: encouraging board 
members to serve, protecting risk-taking, and realizing that courts are ill-equipped 
to substitute their judgment for the board’s judgment.  A fair number of 
jurisdictions have established a blanket rule that the corporate duty-of-care 
standard applies to nonprofits.  See Daniel L. Kurtz, BOARD LIABILITY: A GUIDE FOR 
NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 23 (1988). 
 182. See Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit 
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 928 (2003) (arguing for less deferential judicial 
review for nonprofit boards). 
The world of nonprofits has changed significantly over time; some 
have continued to operate as small, neighborhood charitable 
organizations, while others have transformed themselves into large, 
quasi-business operations, similar to their behemoth corporate 
counterparts. As with any group of this size, nonprofit activities vary 
widely, with organizations ranging from traditional charities, such as 
neighborhood soup kitchens and the Red Cross, to hospitals run in a 
manner similar to for-profit hospitals, to even the National Football 
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An approach that is more appropriate in light of the varied 
nature of nonprofit corporations is to examine the characteristics 
of the organization and determine whether it operates more like a 
for-profit entity or more like a traditional nonprofit.  If the 
organization is clearly a traditional nonprofit, more exacting review 
such as an ordinary negligence standard may be appropriate.183  In 
this way, a nonprofit where the director’s role is more similar to a 
trustee than to a for-profit director would be subject to the more 
exacting standard of judicial review of a trustee.184 
The nonprofit’s characteristics that would be relevant to this 
determination are the characteristics that relate to the traditional 
justifications for the business judgment rule.  For example: whether 
the directors are expected to be risk-averse, whether the 
shareholder/members are able to diversify their risks by removing 
funds or controlling investment decisions, and whether the 
shareholder/members have other remedies available such as 
leaving the organization without significant penalty or voting out 
directors.  As a practical matter, establishing these characteristics 
could be a pleading requirement that burdens the plaintiff. 
Applying this approach to Janssen would require a remand to 
district court to establish relevant facts about MPRA.  The most 
important considerations are likely to be Janssen’s reasonable 
expectations about the type of risk-taking that the board was 
authorized to undertake and whether Janssen was able to diversify 
his retirement funds outside of MPRA or remove them entirely.  It 
is likely that MPRA was expected to undertake sufficient risk 
regarding its pension fund investments so as to provide reasonable 
capital growth to its retirees.185  If this fact alone is true it becomes a 
strong argument for deferential review of MPRA board decisions in 





 183. See id. at 927. 
 184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).  “The trustee is under 
a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill 
as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property.”  
Id. 
 185. Information about the MPRA’s investment strategies or goals or the 
mission of the pension fund is not found in the organizations bylaws.  See 
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE RELIEF ASSOCIATION, FIRST RESTATED BY-LAWS OF THE 
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE RELIEF ASSOCIATION, available at http://www.mpra.net/bylaws. 
htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Deficiencies in the MPRA special litigation committee 
investigation of the merits of the derivative lawsuit against Best & 
Flanagan allowed the supreme court to decide Janssen without 
reaching the issue of which version of the business judgment rule 
applies to Minnesota nonprofit corporations.  In reasoning the 
decision, the court strongly hinted that deferential, one-step review 
applies to Minnesota for-profit corporations.  This presumed stance 
is appropriate given the importance of board autonomy and board 
authority in taking reasonable corporate risks for long-term growth. 
The court holds that the business judgment rule also applies to 
Minnesota nonprofits.  This decision is problematic because of the 
great variety of forms nonprofit corporations take.  A more 
appropriate approach analyzes the relevant characteristics of the 
particular nonprofit to establish whether it is more like a trust or a 
business.  Nonprofits displaying trust characteristics should be 
afforded less deferential, ordinary negligence review for board 
decisions.  The Janssen fact-finding upon remand should focus on 
reasonable expectations of board risk-taking and the ability of 
members to diversify their investment risk.  If the MPRA is 
expected to take sufficient risks to achieve long-term capital 
growth, their board is most likely entitled to deferential business 
judgment rule review. 
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